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LEGAL EFFECTS OF SERVING IMPURE FOOD BY A RESTAURANT
KEEPER TO HIS GUESTS.
The English courts have held that an innkeeper or a restau-
rant keeper1 is not a trader so as to come within the bankrupt
laws. In Crisp v. Pratt,2 the court said that: "an innkeeper does
not get his living by buying and selling, for although he buys
provisions to be spent in his house, he doth not properly sell it,
but utters it at such rates as he thinks reasonable gain, and the
guests do not take it at a certain price, but they may have it or
refuse it at will." 3  Prof. Beale, in his work on Innkeepers (Sec.
169), states the reason for the rule very clearly: "As an inn-
keeper does not lease his rooms, so he does not sell the food
he supplies to the guest. It is his duty to supply such food as
the guest needs, and the corresponding right of the guest is to
consume the food he needs, and to take no more. Having
"'The analogy between the two cases of an innkeeper and a victualler
is so strong that it cannot be got over." Lord Mansfield in Saunderson
v. Rowles, 4 Burrows, 2o67, 2068.
aCroke, Par. 549.
To the same effect are Parker v. Flint, 12 Mod. 254; Saunderson v.
Rowles, supra; Newton v. Trigg, I Salk. iO.
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finished his meal, he has no right to take food from the tables,
even the uneaten portion of food supplied him, nor can he claim
a certain portion of food as his own to be handed over to another
in case he chooses not to consume it himself. The title to food
never passes as a result of an ordinary transaction of supplying
food to a guest."
The Supreme Court of Connecticut in the recent case of
Merrill v. Hodson, 91 Atl. 533, adopted the English rule, holding
that a restaurant keeper did not sell the food he supplied to a
guest, and therefore he could not be held liable on the theory
that there had been a breach of an implied warranty that food
so served was wholesome and fit for consumption.4 The reason-
ing of the court accords with the extract from Prof. Beale's
work, cited above; the court quotes that section in the opinion.
No case, aside from this one, has apparently ever been based
upon an alleged implied warranty of quality by a restaurant
keeper. The cases in which restaurant keepers have been sued
for the harmful consequences from impure food or drink have
all been based upon the negligence of the restaurant keeper.5
However, the rule is laid down in Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 Ill.
518, that a restaurant keeper does not impliedly insure the sound-
ness and wholesomeness of food, not manufactured by him, which
he furnishes to his patrons.6 The same holding in effect is given
in Bigelow v. Maine Central R. R. Co., iio Me. lo5. In
Pantanze v. West, 7 Ala. App. 599, the duty of the restaurant
keeper is said to consist in using due care to see that the food is
fit for eating purposes. The Massachusetts court in the case
of Crocker v. Baltimore Lunch Co., 214 Mass. 177, expressly
refused to consider the question of implied warranty, as the
complaint was based on negligence. The conclusion, therefore,
'The definition of a sale under the Sales Act as adopted by Connect-
icut, that: "a sale of goods is an agreement whereby the seller trans-
fers the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the
price," Public Acts of Conn., i9o7, Ch. 212, Sec. I, (2), is the same as
the common law definition of a sale. Blackstone defines a sale as "a
transmutation of property from one man to another in consideration of
some price," 2 BZ. Coin. 446.
'Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 Ill. 518, 45 N. E. 253, 34 L. R. A. 464,
54 Am. St. Rep. 483; Bigelow v. Maine Central R. R. Co., iio Me. lo5,
85 Atl. 396, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 627; Crocker v. Baltimore Lunch Co.,
214 Mass. 177, IOO N. E. lO78; Pantanze v. West, 7 Ala. App. 599, 61
So. 42; Doyle v. Fuerst & Kramer, 129 La. 838, 56 So. 9o6, 4o L. R. A.
(N. S.) 48o, Ann. Cas. 1913 B. IIIO.
This is also stated to be the rule in 22 Cyc. 1o81.
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reached in the Connecticut case that the restaurant keeper can-
not be held on the ground of implied warranty is in accord with
the sentiment of the American courts where the question has
been touched upon.
The premise by which the Connecticut court reaches this con-
clusion, namely that there is no implied warranty because the
act of the res taurant keeper in furnishing food to a guest is
not a sale of goods, is apparently not supported by any American
decision, although it accords with the English cases as previously
stated. This doctrine, moreover, is expressly denied in two
American courts. In the case of Commonwealth v. Miller, 131
Pa. State, 118, the defendant was prosecuted under a statute
prohibiting the sale of oleomargarine. The oleomargarine had
been furnished to guests in the defendant's restaurant as part of
a meal. In the particular transaction complained of the guests
took the oleomargarine away with them. The court said: "That
the food furnished to McRay and Spence, or so much of it as
they saw fit to appropriate, was sold to them, cannot be reason-
ably questioned; when it was set before them it was theirs to all
intents and purposes, to eat all, or a part, as they chose, subject
only to the restaurateur's right to receive the price. It is
certain that the oleomargarine composed a part of the meal the
price of which was paid, and was embraced in the transaction
as an integral part thereof." Of similar effect is the decision by
the Massachusetts court in Commonwealth v. Warren, i6o Mass.
533, where it was held that if milk is ordered by and delivered
to a customer in a hotel as a part of his breakfast, for which
he pays a round sum, it is a sale of milk, which, if the milk is
"not of good standard quality," will support a prosecution based
upon a statute forbidding the sale of such milk.
The rule in these cases that the food and drink which a guest
orders at a restaurant is sold to him, seems a more natural con-
clusion, and one more in accord with every-day experience, than
the English rule followed in the Connecticut case that the
customer pays for the right to satisfy his appetite by the process
* of destruction.
THE RIGHT OF INHERITANCE OF FREEDMEN BORN OF
SLAVE PARENTS.
It has been recently decided by the United States Supreme
Court that the surviving brothers and sisters of a colored freed-
man dying intestate, who were the children of a born slave and
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were themselves born slaves, are not denied the equal protection
of the laws, contrary to the fourteenth amendment of the Consti-
tution of the United States, by a decision of a State court con-
struing a code provision preferring the brothers and sisters of
an intestate dying without issue over the husband or widow,
as applying only to brothers and sisters born free, with the result
that the intestate's real property acquired by him while he was
a freedman passed to his widow under a section of the code
providing that if one dies intestate "leaving no heir at law capable
of inheriting the real estate, it shall be inherited by the husband
or wife in fee simple."'1
Admitting that the lex rei sitc governs inheritance which is
not a natural or absolute right but the creation of statute, can
it be said that a law which permits one class of citizens to take
as collateral heirs and does not permit another class to do so
because, though they are now freedmen with the same rights
and privileges of other citizens, they are descendants of sometime
slaves, does not discriminate unjustly? Our Supreme Court has
said that it does not because a slave had no inheritable blood and,
because he had not, a descendant cannot inherit where it is
necessary to trace his -line of descent through him, except where
there is express statutory authority. In other words, that slave
ancestry in the law of descent is an algebraic cipher except where
there is express statutory provision to the contrary.
Practically the only reason for the rule is given in a North
Carolina case cited in the opinion in the case under discussion.
There the court said: "While negro slavery prevailed in this
State, the 'laws regulating the descent of estates of inheritance
did not apply to slaves. There were no marriages among them
recognized by law, and they could neither own nor inherit prop-
erty. After they were emancipated-became freedmen-it was
practically impossible to trace their relationship by blood while
they were slaves, with any tolerable degree of certainty. The
confused condition of their family ties and relationships, and
their circumstances as slaves, rendered it necessary to prescribe
by statute who should be the heir at law, and from whom he
might inherit."2  But the Supreme Court of Florida in the same
connection stated: It is a part of the history of the extinct
institution of slavery in the southern States that these slave
marriages were often had with the approbation of the owners
1Jones vs. Jones, 34 Supreme Court Reporter, 937.
' Tucker vs. Bellamy, 98 N. C. 31, 32.
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of the slaves; that the marriage ceremonies were publicly cele-
brated, often by the ministers of the gospel, and were sanctioned
by the churches of the country. * * * The children born of
those marriages were regarded as standing upon a different plane
to those slave children who were bastards pure and simple."3 At
best the question of relationship is one of fact, and if a negro
can prove to the satisfaction of the court his line of descent-and
there was no question on that score in the case before us-
though it pass through slave ancestry, he should be entitled to
the same consideration as a native born white person.
In a North Carolina case4 in point two brothers born of slave
parents had been held entitled to inherit the estate of their father
and upon the death of one of them the survivor was held to be
his heir, notwithstanding a code provision similar to that in the
case here. There may have been some other provision applicable
to the case, for the court stated that "the right of inheriting thus
conferred," referring to the first code provision mentioned, "does
not extend beyond parents and children and the estate of such
parents;" and it may be that the fact that the brothers were
heirs of their father had some bearing in the matter. These
considerations might distinguish the case from the Tennessee
case, in which it is cited, but on the face of it it is an authority
to the contrary despite the contradictory statement in the opinion.
On the whole we feel that the brothers and sisters were entitled
to take as collateral heirs and that a decision to that effect, which
would have declared the Tennessee statute as construed by the
Supreme Court of that State unconstitutional, would have had
the support of common sense.
WHAT FACTS ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE A CASE AGAINST AN
AUTOMOBILE OWNER?
In a recent case' decided by the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts it was held that proof that the defendant owned the
automobile, and that the chauffeur was his servant, and that he
was driving the car at the time of the accident does not make
out a prima facie case, that the chauffeur, when he ran into the
plaintiff's intestate, was driving the car for a purpose within the
scope of his employment.
3 Williams v. Kimball, 35 Fla. 49.
4 lones v. Haggard, jog N. C. 178.
'Hartnett v. Grysmish, io5 N. E. (Mass.) 988.
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The court did not consider that when these facts were shown
an inference arose that the chauffeur was acting within the scope
of his employment. This inference was necessary to constitute a
prima facie case. In failing to give rise to the presumption, it
is contended that the Court was in error.
A presumption is a probable inference which our common sense
draws from circumstances usually occurring in such cases.
2 A
presumption is an inference of the existence of a certain fact
arising from its necessary and usual connection with other facts
that are known.'
Courts must decide questions of law on precedent or on prin-
ciples of justice and reason, when there is no precedent. It is
submitted, that as a fact of ordinary experience, it is reasonable
to presume in the big majority of cases that when the chauffeur
is driving his master's car, accompanied by the master or not,
that he is acting within the scope of his employment. In addi-
tion, by recognizing this presumption, no injustice would be done
to the master. The result would be to charge the master with
a fact which the big majority of ordinary and reasonable people
would infer from these circumstances. Another result of raising
this presumption is to shift the burden of proceeding with the
proof from the plaintiff to the defendant to the extent of balanc-
ing the scales of evidence and thereby refuting this prima facie
case. And it is submitted that the defendant is the party upon
whom the burden of proceeding with the evidence ought to be.
When a servant who is employed for the special purpose of
operating an automobile for a master, is found operating it in
the usual manner, the presumption naturally arises that he is
running the machine in the master's service. If he is not so
running it, this fact is peculiarly within the knowledge of the
master and the burden should" be on him to overthrow this pre-
sumption by evidence of which the law presumes he is in posses-
sion. It would be a hard rule to require the party complaining
of the tortious act to prove by positive proof that the servant
was acting within the scope of his employment."
Newton v. State, 21 Fla., 53, 98.
' Home Ins. Co. v. Weide, 78 U. S. 438; Hilton v. Bender, 69 N. Y.
75, 82.
" Long v. Nute, 123 Mo. App., 204, 209; Shamp v. Lambert, 121 S. W.
(Mo.) 7o; Edgeworth v. Wood, 58 N. J. L. 463; Schuete v. Holliday,
54 Mich. 73; Laman v. Hohler, 122 N. Y. 646; Knust v. Bullock, 59
Wash. 141; Ludgberg % Barghoorn, i31 Pac. (Wash.) I65.
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In the case of Purdy v. Sherman, 74 Wash. 309, the Court
went a step further and held that where it is shown that the
wagon and team belonged to the defendant at the time of the
injury, that fact establishes prima facie, that whoever was driving
was doing it for the owner.
The Court relies on Bourne v. Whitman, 2o9 Mass. 155, as an
authority for their decision on this point, but the point involved
there was whether or not the son was in fact chauffeur for the
father and not whether he was acting within the scope of his
employment. The relation of master and servant was proved.
Also Reynolds v. Denholm, 213 Mass. 576, is mentioned. There
the defendant employed a chauffeur who took his meals and had
his laundry done elsewhere. The master permitted him to use
his car to go for his meals and laundry as he found it convenient.
While going for his laundry he ran into the plaintiff and injured
her. The Court said, "If under these circumstances the jury
should find that this use of the machine was assented to by the
defendant, then he would be liable." The Court also did not
see how as a matter of law they could rule that the jury could
not so find. In the principal case, allowing the presumption, it
would not preclude the jury from a contrary finding unless the
prima facie case was not refuted. There are other cases which
seem to agree with the principal case but the facts are not
analogous." Many of these cases fail to distinguish between
burden of proceeding with the evidence and the burden of proof.
That the rule as suggested is reasonable, based upon common
sense, upheld by decisions in other states, and consistent with
well-recognized rules in *regard to presumptions, are reasons for
questioning the soundness of the rule laid down in the principal
case.
'Farber v. Railway, 1I6 Mo. 81; Lotz v. Hanlon, 217 Pa. 239; see 227
Pa. 448.
